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Abstract: We investigate the effect of resource dependence on district level income in a rare 
within-country study for Indonesia, one of the largest resource producing countries in Asia.  
We follow 390 districts between 2006 and 2015, consider four alternative measures of resouce 
dependence, and instrument for the potential endogeneity of each using historical measures of 
oil, gas and coal reserve locations, and changes in the physical production of each resource.  
Using annual fixed effects and first differenced regressions with and without various 
instruments, we find no evidence of a “resource curse”.  Instead, we find robust evidence across 
all models that dependence as measured by mining’s share of output is positively associated 
with district real per capita income.   We find a similar positive relationship between 
dependence as measured by the share of district government revenues from oil and gas or 
mining overall, and income in our most credible specifications with instruments. For example, 
a standard deviation increase in change in district government dependence on oil/gas revenues 
increases real per capita income by 16 percent over a nine year period. 
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Until the late 1980’s, economists generally argued or assumed that a country’s 
endowment of natural resources benefitted its economic performance. Rostow (1959) argued 
that such endowments played a crucial role in a country’s “take-off” or transition from 
traditional society based on a primary sector, to a more industrialized society with high 
consumption. Similarly, Douglas North stressed the significance of natural resource stocks as 
a driving component of a society’s long-term output (North, 1982).  
By the early 1990’s, however, this positive view of resources in development faced an 
empirical challenge. Many resource abundant nations, located primarily in Africa, the Middle 
East, and Latin America, have tended to have low income levels, unstable growth, and 
generally worse performance on broader development indicators when compared to resource-
scarce countries elsewhere. Auty (1994) was the first to label this counter-intuitive result a 
“resource curse”. This term generally became defined as the negative impact of natural 
resource wealth on economic growth or on broader indicators of social development and 
governance (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007).    
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) conducted the first empirical tests of Auty’s “resource 
curse,” using a large pooled cross section, between-country study over twenty years (1970-
1989) to test the relationship between dependence of exports on natural resources and growth 
in income. The negative association found seemed to confirm Auty’s resource curse, and has 
sparked continuous attention ever since from academics and practitioners. There have 
followed hundreds of studies testing the relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth. The size of the literature is indicated by the number of survey articles (Frankel 
(2010); van der Ploeg (2011); Aragon, Chuhan-Pole and Land (2015); James (2015); Cust & 
Poelhekke (2015b); Papyrakis (2016);  Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016); Badeeb, Lean, 
& Clark, (2017)). 
Many studies have confirmed a negative and significant effect of natural resources on 
economic growth. Gylfason (2001) uses data from 85 countries between 1965-1998 and finds 
that natural resource “abundance” (the share of each nations’s natural capital over national 
wealth) is negatively associated with its growth in per capita GDP.  Gylfason finds similar 
negative results using other resource intensity measures, such as the share of the primary 
sector in each nation’s total employment. Others have found similar negative evidence (Stijns 





(2004) in particular find that natural resources specifically reduce growth indirectly, through 
their effects on intermediate variables such as increased corruption, lowered incentives for 
investment, reduced openness, worsened terms of trade, and weakened demand side 
incentives for schooling. 
Indeed, various potential causal mechanisms have been suggested for a negative overall 
effect of resource abundance or dependence and growth.  The first was the “Dutch Disease”1, 
where booms in resource production and export cause currency appreciation that crowds out 
the performance of tradable non-resource sectors like manufacturing that may have greater 
spillovers for growth in the long run (Sachs and Warner (1995), Frankel (2010)). Other 
proposed mechanisms are that natural resource commodities are especially prone to damaging 
price volatility, or that the low-skill labour required for their production crowds out human 
capital accumulation by reducing the incentives for young people to remain in school 
(Gylfason (2001), Gylfason and Zoega (2006), Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999)).  
Another is that resource dependence weakens the quality of a country’s institutions by 
providing governments with concentrated sources of revenue outside income taxes, thus 
lessening their need for democratic accountability or openness to demands for reform (Ross 
(2001) and Isham, et al. (2005), Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005)).   Another related 
mechanism is that the quality of public spending from resource windfall revenues is poorer 
than that from non resource revenues, being focussed more on current consumption and less 
on investment (Cust and Poelhekke (2015a) and Aragon, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015)).  
Notwithstanding plausible theories for a resource curse, many other empirical 
researchers have found instead a positive association between countries’ resource abundance 
or dependence and economic outcomes, and have expressed skepticism about the original 
results of Sachs and Warner. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), for example, find no 
significant link between resource dependence (the share of mineral exports in GDP averaged 
between 1970-1989) and growth, and find a positive association between resource abundance 
(subsoil wealth) and growth. Alexeev & Conrad (2016) find positive effects on per capita 
GDP of both resource dependence (value of oil production over GDP) and of resource 
abundance (estimated oil reserves). Alexeev and Conrad (2011) similarly find positive effects 
of oil resources on per capita GDP for the transition economies of formerly socialist countries.  
                                                 
1 Initially, this label came from the discovery of natural gas near the town of Groningen in 1956, which 





Most empirical resource curse investigations have followed Sachs and Warner (1995) 
in using between country comparisons, often taking care to include low or middle-income 
countries (Gylfason (2001), Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006), Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004)). Some researches have moved from pooled cross section to country fixed effects to 
control for stable, unobserved country-level characteristics that affect growth (e.g. Torvik 
(2009); Lederman & Maloney (2003)), and among these, some have still found a resource 
curse (Collier and Goderis 2009).  
Some survey and individual resource curse studies have offered critical explanations 
for the literature’s disparate findings. Cust and Poelhekke (2015a), van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke (2016) and Badeeb, Lean, and Clark (2017) note that the negative association 
between between resource dependence in particular and growth has commonly been found in 
cross-country macro-level studies. These and other survey papers have blamed the literature’s 
contradictory findings on weak robustness checks, unobserved heterogeneity across disparate 
countries that affects their economic outcomes, and the likely endogeneity of many 
commonly used resource dependence measures.  For example, Brunschweiler and Bulte 
(2008) argue that Sachs and Warner’s dependence measure (the ratio of resource exports over 
GDP) suffers from endogeneity, and instrument for it using averaged  historical openness to 
trade in earlier periods, whereupon they find no evidence that higher dependence lowers 
economic growth.  Ouoba (2016) similarly finds positive effects in between-country analysis 
once he instruments for a Sachs and Warner type dependence measure. 
Endogeneity aside, survey papers have also suggested that within-country analysis may 
provide a more reliable test of the resource curse hypothesis because it provides greater 
control over unobserved heterogeneity in national factors that affect growth (Van der Ploeg 
and Poelhekke (2016), Papyrakis (2016), Aragona, Chuhan-Pole, and Land (2015), Cust and 
Poelhekke (2015a).  
Of those resource curse studies that have looked within-country, many have indeed 
found a resource blessing rather than curse.  In the case of Brazil, Caselli and Michaels (2013) 
find a positive impact of resource windfalls on local incomes, public goods, and public service 
delivery. In Australia, Hajkowicz, Heyenga, & Moffat (2011) find mining activities have a 
positive effect on per capita GDP and various quality of life indicators. The same conclusion 
is reached by Fan, Fang, & Park (2012) in the case of local level mining in China, by Weber 





(2013) for Russia, and by McMahon and Moreira (2014) in a descriptive study of five 
resource-rich mining countries (Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, and South Africa.) 
Unfortunately, the move to within-country analysis has not resolved the ‘resource 
curse’ debate, as other within-country studies have found opposing results in line with the 
original findings of Sachs and Warner (1995).  Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) examine United 
States counties in pooled cross section over time and find a negative association between 
resource dependence (the share of the primary sector in real gross state product (GSP)), and 
long-term growth in income. The authors finds this even in more homogenous sub-samples 
of counties. James & Aadland (2011) similarly find negative effects using United States 
counties.  Douglas and Walker (2016) focus on coal dependence among Appalachian counties 
in the United States using a panel data set over four decades, and also find negative effects 
on growth.  Guo, Zheng, and Song (2016) similarly find negative, albeit weak linkages 
between resource dependence and output using panel data at the provinvial level in China.    
Surprisingly, while many resource curse studies have been carried out in the Middle 
East, Africa, Latin America and China, few have examined countries in Southeast Asia. 
Indonesia is the richest country in Southeast Asia in terms of natural resource endowments 
(oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, forest products, and agriculture) yet large enough that 
resource abundance and dependence vary dramatically across regions of the country.2   While 
some prominent papers have included Indonesia as a sample country among others (e.g. 
Gylfason (2001), Gylfason and Zoega (2006), Brunnschweiller and Bulte (2008), Arezki and 
van der Ploeg (2011)), few have formally tested for a resource curse within the country.  
In pioneering work within Indonesia, Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006) analyze 
the effect of resource rents (from forestry, mining, oil and gas, or in total) on district level 
GDP, or Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in 2001, the first year of Indonesia’s 
fiscal decentralisation.  Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana find that while total rent (from all 
natural resources) has no significant effect on regional economic growth, mining rents in 
particular have a negative effect.  Edwards (2016b) similarly investigates the effect of mining 
dependence (the share of all non-renewable resource output in GRDP) within Indonesia on 
several social development indicators in 2009.  Edwards finds that mining dependence may 
                                                 
2 In 2016 Indonesia was the world’s 7th largest  producer of mineral fuels, 6th largest coal producer and 1st 
largest coal exporter (World Mining Data 2018; Indonesia, PwC, 2018; ICC, 2013; Brown, 2017).  It is the 





significantly reduce household investment in human capital (measured as education and 
health expenditures). It may also reduce education and health outcomes, measured as 
enrolment rates in senior secondary school, test scores, and births attended by a skilled health 
worker, respectively.  However, similar to Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006), Edwards 
does not use instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity in his resource 
dependence measure.  In addition, both studies have relied on single year cross-section data, 
making their conclusions vulnerable to omitted variable bias.  
Most relevant to our paper, Cust and Rusli (2016) have provided a valuable analysis of 
the effects of district government dependence on oil and gas revenues on level or change in 
district GRDP over the period 1999-2009. Cust and Rusli try to address the potential 
endogeneity of royalties using the instrument of total offshore oil production (within 0-4 
miles of a district’s coastline) in both level and change models. Far from a resource curse, 
Cust and Rusli instead find that oil and gas revenue windfalls boost local economic GRDP.   
While Cust and Rusli’s study provides the highest quality investigation to date of the 
harm or benefit of resource dependence within Indonesia, our current investigation 
contributes on several fronts. First, we start our analysis in 2005 rather than 1999, when the 
capacity of post-decentralisation Indonesian local districts to report accurate data had 
improved, and we extend analysis out to 2015. Second, we examine the effects of coal 
dependence as well as oil and gas, whether as share of local GRDP, or resource revenues as 
share of local government budget. Third, while repeating Cust and Rusli’s use of physical 
output instruments, we also source other instruments related to historical resource abundance 
– a necessary precondition for resource dependence. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief history of natural 
resource development in Indonesia, and describes the country’s decentralisation process 
between 2001 and 2004. Section 3 explains our data and empirical estimation strategies for 
estimating the effects of mining dependence on local income. Section 4 provides our results, 
while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Indonesia’s Natural Resource History 
Indonesia is the third most populous country in the world after China and India. Within 





domestic product.3  The country has a long history of natural resource exploration. Many 
ventures were initiated by Dutch geologists, when the Netherlands colonized Indonesia on 
behalf of the Netherlands East Indies company. The Dutch geologist Jan Reerink surveyed 
and drilled for crude oil beginning in 1871 in what is now the Cirebon district of West Java 
Province. Though this and other early efforts were unsuccessful in extracting substantial 
amounts of oil, they left clues as to the location of oil deposits over West Java and others 
islands.4 
In 1911, the company Royal Dutch (also known as Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij 
or B.P.M) found strong evidence of large deposits on several other islands, and secured 
concessions for roughly 44 oil fields. These succeeded in producing roughly 13 million 
barrels. The competitor Nederlandsche Koloniale Petroleum Maatscappij (N.K.P.M) then 
began exploration in 1912 though with more limited production. By 1930, the  main oil fields 
on Kalimantan Island contributed roughly 68 per cent of Indonesia’s total oil production.  
Caltex, a merger between a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California and the Texas 
Corporation, started operating in Indonesia in 1936.  Caltex conducted much succesful 
exploration and oil production.  By 1940 its wells in the Minas Field of Central Sumatra were 
contributing about 61.5 million barrels annually (Bee, 1982). Oil production fluctuated and 
fell dramatically with the Japanese invasion and Second World War. Indonesia was targeted 
by Japan for occupation in large part because of its vast deposits of natural resources, with 
Dutch concessions taken over by the Japanese. When Japan surrendered to the United States 
in 1945, the young Indonesian leader Soekarno proclaimed Indonesia’s independence. 
Under Soekarno Indonesia nationalized the oil and natural gas sectors. The Indonesia Oil 
Company took what had been left by Royal Dutch, Shell, and other companies. Under the 
Indonesia Oil Company, production rose from 63 million barrels in 1951 to about 177 million 
barrels by 1965. However, a coup attempt by the Communist Party in 1965 destabilized the 
government, with Soekarno accused of protecting communist ideology.  His government 
collapsed, and Major General Soeharto, with the support of the military, became the country’s 
new leader in 1966, and ruled Indonesia until 1998. Soeharto’s government, while 
authoritarian, encouraged foreign investment.  
                                                 
3 From the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Key Selected Indicators data base as 
announced in August 2016. 





Figure 1. Historical Crude Oil Production in Indonesia, 1895-1980 
 
Source: Bee (1982), page 15. 
 
The renamed National Oil Company (PERTAMINA) attracted many foreign oil 
companies to join under “production sharing contracts” to explore and produce crude oil.  As 
a result, many oil discoveries took place beginning in 1968, and resulted in several offshore 
oil fields in North-West Java and East Kalimantan, and onshore fields in Central Sumatra. 
Crude oil production thus increased sharply in Indonesia between 1960-1980 (see Figure 1). 
While much less prominent than oil, natural gas extraction also climbed rapidly in Indonesia, 
starting in 1976. Fields in the Aceh Utara and Kutai districts contributed to commercializing 
Indonesia’s natural gas production for export (Bee, 1982). 
While crude oil has been the dominant non-renewable resource exploited in Indonesia, 
coal mining also has a long history. In the 1850’s, geologists of the Dutch colonial 
government struggled to find coal abundant areas, with little attention paid thereafter. More 
than a century later, coal exploration expanded quickly during Soeharto’s rule in the late 
1970’s, driven by the falling price of oil.  Following this exploration, coal was found in West 
Sumatra, East and South Kalimantan Provinces between 1973-1980, under the supervision of 
the state owned mining company PN Tambang Batu Bara. Coal extraction rapidly expanded 





foreign companies who had found the deposit to sign Coal Contracts of Work (CCoW). Much 
of the country’s subsequent coal production has been sourced from these locations, with those 
CCoW signed between 1981 and 1990 accounting for more than 50 per cent of total coal 
output in 2015 ((Leeuwen (1994) and Friederich and van Leeuwen (2017)).5 
Crucially for our subsequent estimation strategy, we argue that the historical 
locations of oil and gas fields and coal deposits in Indonesia established by the early 
1980’s have become the main areas of mineral extraction in the time covered by our study.  
Moving to the more recent development of Indonesia’s natural resources, Figure 2 
shows the production of all resource types from 1973-2012. Together, oil and coal have 
comprised more than 60 per cent of total production. From the late 1990’s onward oil has 
declined relative to coal, usually attributed to falling world oil prices from excess supply and 
weakened demand from European and Asian countries and rising natural gas use.  In contrast, 
world coal prices have risen, driven by the high demand in China, India, and in some parts of 
Europe.  Oil still remains, however, the largest contributor to mining production.  In contrast 
to oil and coal, natural gas production has remained modest over the 1976-2012 period, rising 
only in 2009 after the central launched a conversion program for consumers away from 
kerosene. Note finally from Figure 2 that production of the remaining types of resource is 
relatively small.  
2.1 Decentralisation and Resource Rent Allocation 
Indonesia has undergone major changes in governance from the late 1990’s to early 2000’s.  
The authoritarian government under Soeharto, while providing political stability and 
encouraging foreign investment, hampered democracy and provided much scope for rent-
seeking among those with ties to the government. Indonesia’s economy performed 
particularly badly following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, resulting in Soeharto stepping 
down and paving the way for a change from a highly centralized to a highly decentralized 
and democratically accountable system of provincial and district level governance. 
 
 
                                                 
5 There were eleven foreign companies under contract with the Indonesia government under PN Tambang: 
Arutmin, Utah Indonesia, Agip, Kaltim Prima Cola, Adaro, Kideco, Berau, Chung Hua, Allied Indo Coal, 





Figure 2. Production of mining in Indonesia, specified by types, 1973-2012 
 





Decentralisation began with the implementation of the autonomy law (Law 21/1999) and 
revenue sharing law (Law 25/1999).  Local citizens in each district would elect their regional 
leaders for both executive and legislative positions, while conversely, the administrative and 
political processes and regulatory framework would become homogenized. Under revenue 
sharing, resource revenues were to be first collected by the central government, and then 
redistributed to districts such that more resource productive districts receive a larger share of 
revenues.  In particular, a share of revenues from onshore oil and gas wells would be allocated 
to the district containing the wellhead.  Revenue from offshore wells would go to the district 
with the closest coastline if within 4 miles, to the province if within 4-12 miles, and remain 
with the central government beyond that.  For coal and other minerals, district revenues would 
be calculated based on the total area in which coal companies had a license to operate, as well 
as by production volumes and sales price. Coal revenues would thus return to districts based 
on fixed land rents and per unit royalties.  One implication of the overall transfer rules 
between the central and provincial governments is that a given district’s receipt of resource 
revenues will increase with the resource wealth of the other districts in its province.6 At the 
extreme, a district without resource production would receive no windfall revenues if all other  
                                                 
6 Under decentralisation provinces do not have much administrative authority beyond their role in 






Table  1  Percentage of Point Source Natural Resources Revenue Sharing Allocation 
No Type of Natural 
Resources 









1 Oil 84.5 3.1 6.2 
2 Natural gas 69.5 6.1 12.2 
3 Coal and other minerals 
(Land rents)  
20 16 64 
4 Coal and other minerals 
(Royalties) 
20 16 32 
Source: DJPK Depkeu, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia (Type of natural resources 
is restricted only for “point-source” resources type) 
 
 
districts in its province also extract no resources.  Table 1 summarises the allocation rules. 
By 2001 most of the country’s 336 districts applied to be responsible for public service 
delivery, and to receive enabling financing from the central government.  A revised revenue 
sharing Law 33/2004 replaced Law 25/1999 in 2004.  Decentralisation was fully implemented 
by 2005, and natural resource income became an important source of finance for some 
districts (Aden (2001)).   
 
3 Data and Empirical Estimation Strategy 
We focus on the effects of resource dependence (a flow) rather than abundance (a stock) 
for two reasons. First, unlike dependence, abundance measures such as estimated oil and coal 
deposits are not generally available at the district level, particularly over time.  Second, most 
previous empirical studies have tended to use dependence measures.  We begin with a 
measure of mining dependence (which includes coal, oil, gas, and all minerals, including 
quarrying) similar to what has been employed by within-country papers such as Douglas and 
Walker (2016) and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) for the United States, or the Indonesian 
study by Edwards (2016b).  Edwards employs mining and quarrying’s share of total GRDP 
for each district in Indonesia using cross-sectional data, in 2009.  We use this as our first 





However, some within-country studies have instead tried to capture resource 
dependence as the reliance of governments on resource rents or royalties, particularly in 
studies of large decentralised systems such as Brazil where central governments transfer 
revenues from extraction back to local districts based on “producer origin” (Casselli and 
Michaels (2013), Bjorvatn, et al. (2012), Cust and Rusli (2014, 2016) and Douglas and 
Walker (2016).7  We therefore try three additional measures, namely district government 
dependence on mining revenues (MINREV) from oil, gas and coal, or just from oil and gas 
(OILGASREV), or just from coal (COALREV).  These data are obtained from the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance and the Audit Investigation Board (BPK) from 2005 to 2015.8 
Most of the remaining data required for this study come from the “Indonesia Data for 
Policy and Economic Research” or INDODAPOER data base published by the World Bank.9 
INDODAPOER provides more than 300 indicators at district level, gathered from official 
government sources such as Susenas (the National Economic Survey), the Indonesia 
Statistical National Agency (BPS), and the Ministry of Finance.10  Unfortunately, most 
district level observations are missing for most variables prior to decentralisation (1976-
2003). Fewer district level observations are missing from 2003 to 2005, and virtually none 
thereafter. To populate missing observations from 2003 onward, I use the statistical yearbook 
published by the BPS.11 A list of variables and their definitions is presented in Appendix 1. 
We ultimately elected to exclude 2003 and 2004 because of evidence of some 
unevenness in the quality of the district level data in these years of political transition and 
revisions to the planned revenue sharing Law 33/2004 that were implemented in 2005.  In 
short, only by 2005 were both elections and revenue sharing effectively implemented by all 
districts, and missing observations cease. 
An obstacle to following districts since 2005 has been the official government policy 
since 2001 of “proliferation” (pemekaran) of districts with the aim of making local 
                                                 
7 Komarulzaman & Alisjahbana (2006) and Loayza & Rigolini (2016) also use a similar measure of 
resource dependence. Cust & Poelhekke (2015a) discuss the importance of observing the effects of 
revenue based on natural resources under fiscally decentralized systems. 
8 The Audit Board publications can be downloaded from http://www.bpk.go.id/lkpp , while the Ministry 
of Finance data from http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/?page_id=307. 
9 The datasets can be downloaded from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/indonesia-database-for-
policy-and-economic-research.   
10 These include rural districts (kabupaten) and urban districts (kota/municipalities). 





government closer to the people in the hopes of improving public service delivery.  According 
to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the number of districts in Indonesia has risen from 336 
districts in 2001, to 477 in 2010, to 512 in 2015.  To facilitate longitudinal analysis,  we merge 
“child” districts back into their “parent” districts using the annual population of each “child” 
to create appropriate weights. Since most districts existing in 2015 were identifiable from 
parent districts in 2003, we use this as our benchmark year.12 This results in 390 consolidated 
districts for each year after 2003, creating a balanced panel. 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
We use three approaches to estimate the effects of resource dependence on output: 
annual district fixed effects, a first-difference regression between 2006 and 2015, and a 
similar first difference regression with instruments for our resource dependence measures.  
Fixed Effects (FE) has the advantage of controlling for district-specific effects on 
growth caused by unobserved heterogeneity between districts.   
 , , , , . ......................... (1) 
 
Here GRDP is per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product (real prices in 2000) of 
district  at time ,	where  = (1, ..., 390), and time  = (2005,….,2015). The natural log of 
GRDP is used as is common in standard growth models, in order to mitigate problems such 
as potential skewness or stationarity that often occurs in annual income panel data (see 
Wooldridge, 2016, and resource curse studies by Mamun, et al. (2017), Bjorvatn, et al. (2012), 
Sarmidi, et al. (2014), and Cust and Rusli (2014, 2016)).  RD refers to the resource 
dependence of district i in year t,  is the district fixed effect, and is a year dummy to 
control for events common to all districts at a point in time, such as changes in commodity 
prices, business cycle fluctuations, or economic crises. The error term,  is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). 
We try four alternative measures of our key ,  variable as described previously: the 
share of mining in district real GRDP (MINDEP), the share of the district government’s 
                                                 
12 The 2003 list of districts comes from the Ministry of Home Affairs. We exclude the regions of Jakarta 
(Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, East Jakarta, South Jakarta, Kepulauan Seribu) and Tanjung Pinang district. 
Jakarta is excluded because it is not defined as a district under decentralisation law. The latter district is 





revenues that come from combined oil, gas and coal (MINREV), or from oil and gas alone 
(OILGASREV), or coal alone (COALREV).   
Finally in (1), ,  is a matrix comprising other determinants of GRDP per capita, such 
as the total number of annual earthquake events at the district level, the labour force 
participation rate, and the proportion of households with access to electricity. The latter two 
variables range from 0-1. Some standard control variables from cross-country growth studies, 
such as openness to trade (export activities) or private investment are unfortunately not 
available within country.  
We next try a first difference (FD) model because it allows resource dependence to 
have long term effects on GDP (Barro (1991)). FD models are similar to FE models in 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in districts that affects growth (Wooldridge, 2016). 
Aside from being widely used in the resource curse literature, FD also provides a “bridging” 
model for attempts to address potential endogeneity of resource dependence measures using 
cross sectional instruments.  We take a 10 year difference,  and retain 2005 as a 
baseline year to control for initial district GRDP as commonly implemented in growth and 
resource curse studies (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Douglas and Walker, 2016; Edwards, 
2016b).  The inclusion of initial GRDP tests for convergence in income between districts as 
suggested in traditional growth theory (Barro (1991) and Temple (1999)). A negative 
coefficient would imply that poorer districts have subsequently had higher growth than richer 
districts.  
Our first difference model is:  
 ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ ∆ , ......................... (2) 
 
where ∆ , , ) and ∆ , is the nine year change 
in the level of resource dependence in district i. The ∆ ′  stands for changes in some control 
variables like labour force participation rate, but we also include the initial level of population 
in 2005 (in logs) and the total number of earthquake events over the difference period. We 
include initial population to test for potential pro-growth effects of economies of scale.  We 
now also include additional level dummies that would wash out in FE: urban status 
(DURBAN), and location on Java Island (DJAVA). Historically, Indonesian investment and 





We finally use a first difference model with instrumental variables.  Several key 
resource curse papers criticize the commonly used measures of resource dependence as being 
very likely to suffer from endogeneity. Dependence measures are commonly constructed as 
a ratio, where the denominator captures overall economic activity in a way that may be related 
to the dependent variable.  We therefore look for valid exogenous instruments for our four 
resource dependence measures. We did not use instruments in our annual FE model because 
our main instrument is time invariant.   
To be valid, an instrument must be correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor 
in the first-stage regression, and not correlated with the error term. We  follow the strategies 
of Edwards (2016a) in an international cross-country context, Caselli and Michaels (2013) 
for Brazil, and Cust and Rusli (2016) for Indonesia of constructing measures of past resource 
abundance.  For example, Edwards (2016a) uses 1971 estimated national fuel reserves,  
Caselli and Michaels use Brazil’s past oil output, and Cust and Rusli use change in national 
oil and gas output between 1999 and 2009 for Indonesia.  All of these approaches seem likely 
to generate instruments that are correlated with subsequent resource dependence, because 
past abundance or rises in physical production seem logical pre-conditions for greater 
resource dependence.  We thus instrument for our various ∆  measures using each district’s 
historical level of abundance of the relevant resources, or .   
Our historical abundance level instruments are produced using original historical maps 
released by Bee (1982) and Leeuwen (1994, 2017). ArcGIS software was used to match 
geographic coordinates of oil/gas fields or coal exploration agreement areas according to the 
Bee, Leeuwen, and Frederich and Leeuwen maps with specific district boundaries as of 2003. 
This resulted in new maps which we illustrate in Appendices 2-3. We try both continous and 
binary versions.  For binary versions, we classify districts as oil or gas abundant if they had 
at least one proven major field as of the 1970’s, and as coal abundant if at least 20 per cent 
of a district was covered by “first contract” agreements with coal companies as of the 1980’s. 
By this time, knowledge of resource locations had accumulated based in part on exploration 
efforts by the Dutch when Indonesia was a colony. Yet this period also immediately 
preceeded a “golden era” of natural resource commercialization in Indonesia.13  
                                                 
13 One might argue that measurable resource abundance is not actually exogenous to income, since poorer 
regions might invest less in oil, coal or gas exploration. However, as we have described, historical 
exploration in Indonesia was funded centrally either by Dutch geologists, or the Indonesian central 





For continous versions, for oil and gas we use the number of major or minor oil and 
gas fields in the 1970’s.14 For coal we divide “first contract” deposit areas by total district 
areas as shown in an original map by Leeuwen (1994) and Frederich and Leeuwen (2017). 
Table 2 summarizes our abundance based instruments as customised for each of our four 
resource dependence measures. 
While levels of past abundance or extraction seems a logical pre-condition for 
dependence, it is less clear ex ante why they should be correlated with change in dependence.  
It is possible that for oil and gas, the considerable capital and risk bearing needed to ramp up 
extraction following succesful exploration could lead to a positive correlation. For coal, first 
contracts might only reveal the potential for viable coal deposits to be found, which would 
require time to confirm with geological sampling.15  Nonetheless, in case of instrument 
weakness, we also try to construct a change form of an abundance instrument. This is difficult 
to do since it requires a reliable measure of resource reserves at district level over the two 
years 2006 and 2015. Since such data is not publicly available from the Indonesian 
government, we follow Caselli and Michaels (2013) and Cust and Rusli (2016) in using the 
change in physical oil and gas output. Data on oil and gas lifting are released by the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), who use them as a basis for district revenue 
redistribution.  For coal, we use instead changes in combined land rents and royalties.  
Taking our first resource measure (MINDEP) to illustrate, the first and second stage 
regressions are modelled as follows:  
 ∆ 	 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ 	 	∆  (3) 
 ∆ ∆ ∆ ′ ∆  (4) 
 
 
We use all instruments together when using MINDEP or MINREV. For OILGASREV 
we drop levels of coal abundance and changes in coal revenues as instruments, while for 
COALREV we drop the corresponding instruments for oil and gas abundance and change in 
production.  Our mapping of instruments is summarized in Table 2. 
                                                 
14 For coastal oil fields in particular, we only include oil and gas wells within 4 miles of the coastline, based 
on revenue sharing rules laid out under Law 33/2004. 
15 By comparing current maps of main extraction activities provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, it is clear that no dramatic shift has occured over the 2006-2015 period. Thus, there is no way 
for district governments to enjoy resource windfalls in 2015 without having had successfully proven 
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For all IV estimation we use two step feasible efficient Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM2S) with robust standard errors rather than two stage least squares (2SLS) 
to address the potential presence of heteroskedasticity and produce more efficient estimates. 
We then perform validity tests for weakness and overidentification, given that the number of 
instruments exceeds the number of suspected endogenous regressors.  
 
4 Empirical Results 
Summary statistics for annual panel and first-difference data are shown in Tables 3 and 
4, respectively.  We have 4,290 observations for 390 districts in FE, and 390 observations in 





per cent, while the mean share of mining revenue in district government budgets is about 5.3 
per cent.  From Table 4, for the country as a whole, dependence of  GRDP on mining has 
been growing slightly, yet dependence of district government budgets on resource revenues 
has been declining. 
To start with simple correlations, Figure 3 presents a scatterplot of each district’s 11 
year averaged dependence of GRDP on mining (MINDEP) against its real GRDP per capita. 
Already there appears to be a positive relationship, confirmed by a linear fitted trendline. 
Figure 4 shows a similar positive correlation between share of district government revenues 
from oil and gas and real GRDP per capita.  
As a second illustration, we compare the real growth in GRDP per capita between the 
country’s least and most dependent on mining in GRDP.16  We find that more dependent 
districts grew by 8.2 percentage points more than less dependent districts between 2006 to 
2015, which a simple t test finds to be a significant difference at the one per cent level.  To 
see if this resource blessing persists with control for confounding factors, we proceed to 
regressions. 
We begin with our FE results as reported in Table 5. The impact of the four dependence 
measures are presented in models (1) to (4), respectively.  We find mining dependence 
(MINDEP) in model (1) is significantly positively associated with real GRDP per capita.  In 
particular, a standard deviation increase in MINDEP (0.179) is associated with an increase in 
real district income per capita of (0.179*0.406 = 0.0727) 7.27 per cent, on average, all else 
equal.  Oil and gas revenue dependence in model (2) has a positive sign, but is not significant.  
In contrast, coal resource revenue dependence in model (3) has a negative effect on GRDP 
per capita, albeit only significant at the 10% level.  Not surprisingly given the opposing 
effects, the combined oil, gas and coal revenue dependence in model (4) has a coefficient 
near zero, and is not significant. At first glance, FE results may indicate that resource 
dependence in overall output is good for GRDP, while dependence in government budgets 
has either no effect, or possibly a negative effect if dependence is specifially on coal revenues. 
That is, the closest we come to finding a resource curse is with the narrow measure of district 
government budget dependence on coal revenues. 
                                                 
16 We rank the 390 districts by mining’s share in its GRDP as averaged between 2006 and 2015, and then 
split these into two equal sized groups. The more mining-dependent districts grew 45.5 % over the nine 





Table 3 Descriptive statistics for all districts/years pooled 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real GRDP per capita 
(in logs) 4290 4.139377 0.690165 1.951301 7.683826 
Mining Dependence 
GRDP 4290 0.090965 0.179296 0 0.954621 
Mining Revenue 
Dependence 4290 0.052757 0.123603 0 0.872433 
Oil&gas revenue 
Dependence 4290 0.03799 0.106686 0 0.871858 
Coal Revenue 
Dependence 4290 0.014772 0.044392 0 0.550445 
Earthquake 4290 0.05990 0.25257 0 3 
Labour force 
participation rate 4290 0.645012 0.095994 0.1949 0.988 
Households with 
electricity 4290 0.874352 0.189802 0.0028 1 
 
 
Looking at other control variables in Table 5, GRDP looks to be negatively associated 
with the frequency of earthquake events, though only at the 10 per cent level. Model (2) finds, 
for example, that one additional earthquake between 2005 and 2015 decreases real per capita 
GRDP by 0.0168 per cent.  The labour force participation rate has a positive coefficient but 
is not significant, nor surprisingly is the proportion of households with access to electricity. 
Overall, our FE results do not support the standard resource curse hypothesis, with a 
possible exception for local government dependence on coal mining revenues.  These results 
are similar to those found by Cust and Rusli (2016) at the district level for oil and gas alone, 
but they do not address potential endogeneity of our dependence measures.  
Moving to our FD models, with a direct measure of urban/rural status, we no longer use 
household access to electricity.  Recall we also now include initial real GRDP per capita in 
2005 (in logs) to control for initial economic conditions, and the size of initial district 
population in 2005 to test for gains to growth from economies of scale.  Results are provided 
in Table 6, again by resource dependence meausure in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4).  As with 
FE, we find a strong positive association between output dependence (model 1) and GRDP 
per capita. In particular, a standard deviation increase in the change in mining’s share of local 
GRDP is associated with a (=0.142 * 0.738 = 0.105) 10.5 per cent increase in GRDP per 
capita. Yet also as with FE, the effects of government dependence on resource revenues is 





Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for First Difference Model 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆ Real GRDP per capita 
(in logs) 390 0.413809 0.344784 -0.85163 2.685206 
∆Mining Dependence 390 
0.011747 0.141974 -0.61372 0.795062 
∆Mining Revenue 390 -0.01322 
0.084406 -0.52328 0.255585 
∆Oilgas Revenue 390 
-0.02868 0.091328 -0.52781 0.224138 
∆Coal Revenue 390 
0.015421 0.047512 -0.11861 0.358853 
Earthquake 390 0.464103 





0.112044 -0.1906 0.4427 




1.028841 9.450066 15.227 




0.703827 1.951301 7.683826 
DURBAN 390 0.207692 0.406176 0 1 
DJAVA 390 0.302564 0.459958 0 1 
Instruments   
Oilgas_continous 390 0.153846 0.660138 0 7 
Coal deposit_continous 390 3.660233 14.32723 0 94.2137 
Oilgas_binary 390 0.058974 0.235879 0 1 
Coal deposit_binary 390 0.066667 0.249764 0 1 
∆oil production 
(thousand barrels) 
390 -103.164 3805.166 -22751.3 64381.61 
∆gas production 
(MMBTU) 
390 267.5436 31094.97 -402891 378035.7 
∆ coal production (IDR) 390 92.61852 508.369 -45.2773 5845.853 
 
 
in model (3), or combined revenue dependence in model (4), none of the measures is 
significant, though the signs have reversed from in FE estimation.  
Among other controls in FD, the impact of earthquake frequency on district economic 
performance is similar to that found in FE in all models, though it is now defined as a 
cumulative total of each district’s earthquakes over the 10 year period (2006-2015).  
Interestingly, the coefficient on baseline GRDP per capita is significantly negative in all four 
models at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that there has been convergence of incomes between 
poorer and richer districts during the decentralisation period.  Among other control variables, 









There is marginal evidence that districts located in Java have grown more rapidly than other 
districts, though significant only at the 10% level in model (1). 
To summarize, with first difference models where potential endogeneity of resource 
dependence is not yet addressed, we again find evidence that dependence of output on mining 
resources is positively associated with real GRDP, and no clear evidence that government 
revenue dependence affects real GRDP.   
We finally move to what we believe are our most credible specifications, FD with 
instrumental variables.  Models (1 ), (2 ), (3 )    and (4 ) of Table 6 provide results using the 
continous form of our abundance type instruments (along with change in output instruments), 
while the same columns in Table 7 provides results with binary type abundance instruments.  
Recall that the continous abundance instruments are defined as the total number of major and 
minor petroleum (oil and natural gas) fields in the 1970’s, and the share of coal deposit areas 
to total district areas in the 1980’s.    
We start with whether the continuous instruments satisfy relevance and 
overidentification tests. The instruments are strong, with Kleibergen Paap Wald F statistic 
rangings from 14.8 in model (4’), to 27.7 in model (2’).  These values exceed Stock and Yogo 





Figure 4. Oil + Gas Revenue Dependence vs. Real GRDP per capita (averaged over time) 
 
 
model (4’), where it only exceeds the 15% maximal size. Regarding overidentification, the 
Hansen J statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments in all models 
(1’) to (4’), though with a p value of only 0.1486 in model (4’) of 0.1486. Thus our instruments 
appear valid for Table 6. 
We next test whether our (change in) resource dependence measures, the ∆  for each 
model, are exogenous. In the share of GRDP model (1’), the p value from a Hausman-type 
endogeneity test cannot reject exogeneity (p value 0.2481), whereas in all share of revenue 
models (2 ), (3 ),   and (4 ) exogeneity can be clearly or marginally rejected, with p values of 
0.015, 0.018, and .108, respectively. For Table 6 we therefore take models (1), (2 ), (3 )   to 
be the most credible, with ambiguous evidence between (4) and (4 ).   
Just as in the FD case without instruments, we find no evidence that non-renewable 
resource dependence creates an adverse effect on growth.  Instead, we now find evidence of 
a positive effect on growth of local government dependence on oil and gas (model (2 )) and 
of dependence of revenue on mining overall for model (4 ) if instruments are used.  As before 
however, we find no signifcant effect on growth of coal revenue dependence in model (3 ),
though with a negative sign.  More specifically, an increase of a standard deviation in the 





Table 5 Panel Fixed Effect Model of the Effect of Resource Dependence on real GRDP per 
capita 
Dependent Variable: GRDP per capita (in logs) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4 
Mining Dependence 0.406***    
 (0.113)    
Oil&Gas Revenue  0.167   
  (0.170)   
Coal revenue   -0.421*  
   (0.241)  
Mining Revenue    0.0353 
    (0.132) 
Earthquake -0.0159* -0.0164* -0.0167* -0.0168* 
 (0.00834) (0.00873) (0.00876) (0.00876) 
Labour force  0.105 0.117 0.104 0.117 
 (0.0784) (0.0776) (0.0784) (0.0771) 
Household elect. -0.0728 -0.00834 -0.00453 -0.00701 
 (0.0888) (0.0921) (0.0929) (0.0922) 
Constant 3.891*** 3.867*** 3.879*** 3.869*** 
 (0.0752) (0.0763) (0.0761) (0.0764) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,290 4,290 4,290 4,290 
R-squared 0.492 0.478 0.479 0.478 
Number of DISTRICT1 390 390 390 390 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(0.091*1.765 = 0.1606) 16.1 per cent. If instruments are used, a standard deviation increase 
in overall mining revenue dependence increases income by (0.084*1.164=0.0982) 9.8 per 
cent. These findings do not support a resource curse, but are consistent with past desriptive 
claims about the beneficial effects of past oil booms in Indonesia (see Gylfason, 2001; Rosser, 
2007; Sovacool, 2010).  
The effects of other control variables are generally similar to the FD model without 
instruments. For example, the cumulative number of earthquakes over 10 years negatively 
affects per capita income growth at district level in Indonesia in all four models of resource 
dependence. Initial GRDP per capita again has a strong negative association with district 
income per capita, indicating convergence as before.  
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Table  6  First difference model of effect of resource dependence on GRDP per capita (continous abundance levels plus change in production IV’s)  
Dependent Variable: ∆GRDP per capita (in logs)             
 (1) (1’) (2) ( ’) (3) ( ’) (4) ( ’) 
VARIABLES OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.738*** 1.356***       
 (0.190) (0.444)       
∆Oilgas Revenue   -0.160 1.765**     
   (0.473) (0.810)     
∆Coal Revenue     0.469 -0.696   
     (0.522) (0.645)   
∆Mining Revenue       -0.0757 1.164** 
       (0.389) (0.581) 
Earthquake -0.0325** -0.0306* -0.0336*** -0.0347*** -0.0319*** -0.0373*** -0.0341*** -0.0264** 
 (0.0133) (0.0181) (0.0118) (0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0111) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.0369 0.0589 0.0254 0.0513 0.0730 -0.0445 0.0195 0.215 
 (0.186) (0.189) (0.192) (0.234) (0.189) (0.201) (0.206) (0.179) 
Ln GRDP per capita, 2005 -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.148*** -0.0350 -0.150*** -0.119*** -0.141*** -0.0973** 
 (0.0318) (0.0355) (0.0366) (0.0663) (0.0342) (0.0386) (0.0294) (0.0394) 
Population, 2005 (in logs) 0.00758 0.0234 0.000282 0.0212 0.00390 -0.00568 0.000152 0.0315 
 (0.0233) (0.0203) (0.0258) (0.0263) (0.0255) (0.0254) (0.0265) (0.0212) 
DURBAN 0.0455 0.0751* 0.0402 0.0119 0.0473 0.0181 0.0364 0.0479 
 (0.0421) (0.0415) (0.0420) (0.0585) (0.0447) (0.0474) (0.0438) (0.0447) 
DJAVA 0.0845* 0.114* 0.0380 -0.0477 0.0364 0.0291 0.0340 -0.0222 
 (0.0483) (0.0598) (0.0467) (0.0496) (0.0437) (0.0433) (0.0451) (0.0419) 
Constant 0.730** 0.487* 0.983*** 0.351 0.938*** 0.973*** 0.961*** 0.397 
 (0.290) (0.282) (0.357) (0.323) (0.328) (0.320) (0.350) (0.256) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat  8.900  29.017  111.683  27.509 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F   16.834  27.754  25.347  14.807 
Hansen J statistic, P-value  0.2228  0.3552  0.6354  0.1486 
Endogeneity test, P value  0.2481  0.0149  0.0178  0.1081 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.158 0.103 0.075 -0.107 0.077 0.065 0.074 -0.001 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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As a robustness check, we try a similar exercise to Table 6 with binary definitions of 
historical abundance in Table 7. As previously described, districts are classified as oil and 
gas abundant if they contained at least one major field, and coal abundant if coal deposit 
agreements take up 20% of its land area or more. Kleibergen F statistics still indicate 
instrument strength for all revenue dependence models (2’), (3’) and (4’), with F values 
between 13.896 and 30.976, respectively. Instruments are weaker, however, for GRDP share 
in model (1 ) with an F value of 7.76.  More happily, overidentification test p values are 
clearly above rejection thresholds in all models. Thus the binary abundance instruments 
combined (combined with physical production change instruments) are valid, albeit with 
some weakness in model (1’).  Exogeneity tests for resource dependence again indicate as 
before that it cannot be rejected for model (1) and can be rejected for (2’), and can now more 
clearly be rejected in (4’), but now not rejected for model (3). We therefore treat (1), (2’), (3) 
and (4’) as our most credible specifations. 
Moving to findings, we find that resource dependence is significantly positively 
associated with GRDP in three of four models – mining’s share of GRDP, oil and gas revenue 
dependence, and overall mining revenue dependence.  The coefficient on coal revenue 
dependence in (3) is positive also, but not significant.  To illustrate, in model (2’), a one 
standard deviation increase in the change in oil and gas revenue dependence is associated 
with an increase in per capita GRDP of about (0.091*1.359 = 0.124) 12.4 per cent. Thus, with 
binary abundance instruments, we find our strongest evidence of a resource blessing, with 
mining’s share of GRDP or oil and gas or overall mining’s share of local government revenue 
positively associated with per capita real income, and thus with growth. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, we have almost no evidence of a resource curse within Indonesia.  Rather, with 
estimation methods that control for unobserved heterogeneity between districts that could 
affect their growth in GRDP, and valid instruments for potentially endogenous measures of 
resource dependence, we find strong evidence of a classical resource blessing.  When 
resource dependence is measured as the share mining (oil, gas and coal) holds in a district’s 
gross regional domestic product, MINDEP, we find this is significantly positively associated 
with GRDP in fixed effects estimation, and first difference estimation, with or without 
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Table  7  First difference model of effect of resource dependence on GRDP per capita (binary abundance levels plus change in production IV’s)  
Dependent Variable: ∆GRDP per capita in logs            
 (1) ( ’) (2) ( ’) (3) ( ’) (4) ( ’) 
VARIABLES OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM OLS IV-GMM 
∆Mining Dependence 0.738*** 1.143**       
 (0.190) (0.579)       
∆Oilgas Revenue   -0.160 1.359*     
   (0.473) (0.710)     
∆Coal Revenue     0.469 -0.456   
     (0.522) (0.708)   
∆Mining Revenue       -0.0757 1.059* 
       (0.389) (0.637) 
Earthquake -0.0325** -0.0310* -0.0336*** -0.0341*** -0.0319*** -0.0352*** -0.0341*** -0.0273** 
 (0.0133) (0.0181) (0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0113) 
∆Labour force partic.rate 0.0369 0.135 0.0254 0.0677 0.0730 -0.00293 0.0195 0.237 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.192) (0.218) (0.189) (0.202) (0.206) (0.173) 
Ln GRDP per capita, 2005  -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.148*** -0.0559 -0.150*** -0.128*** -0.141*** -0.0872** 
 (0.0318) (0.0351) (0.0366) (0.0563) (0.0342) (0.0384) (0.0294) (0.0391) 
Population, 2005 (in logs) 0.00758 0.0286 0.000282 0.0200 0.00390 0.000595 0.000152 0.0308 
 (0.0233) (0.0199) (0.0258) (0.0247) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0265) (0.0209) 
DURBAN 0.0455 0.0687 0.0402 0.0186 0.0473 0.0299 0.0364 0.0392 
 (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0526) (0.0447) (0.0470) (0.0438) (0.0436) 
DJAVA 0.0845* 0.0933 0.0380 -0.0322 0.0364 0.0253 0.0340 -0.0186 
 (0.0483) (0.0658) (0.0467) (0.0472) (0.0437) (0.0434) (0.0451) (0.0430) 
Constant 0.730** 0.415 0.983*** 0.430 0.938*** 0.919*** 0.961*** 0.368 
 (0.290) (0.281) (0.357) (0.293) (0.328) (0.322) (0.350) (0.257) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat  8.108  41.389  115.597  31.065 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F   7.759  30.976  27.580  13.896 
Hansen J statistic, P-value  0.2691  0.4555  0.6313  0.4702 
Endogeneity test, P value  0.6970  0.0180  0.1674  0.0630 
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R-squared 0.158 0.136 0.075 -0.036 0.077 0.072 0.074 0.012 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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instruments.  In our most credible specification (first difference without instruments), a 
standard deviation increase in the change is MINDEP increases real GRDP per capital 
between 2006 and 2015 by 7.27%.  Evidence is less robust for resource dependence is 
measured as the share resource tax revenues play in district government budgets.  But even 
here, where endogeneity is addressed using valid instruments, we find that dependence on oil 
and gas revenues, or from overall mining revenues, is also positively associated with growth.  
In our most credible specification (first difference with continous instruments), a standard 
deviation increase in the change in OILGASREV increases income between 2006 and 2015 
by 16.1%.  The only resource dependence measure for which we find no pro-growth effects 
is coal revenue dependence.  Table 8 provides a qualitative summary of our findings. 
In the context of the resource curse literature, our results are in contrast with findings 
from some prominent between-country studies (from Sachs and Warner (1995), (1999)) or 
Collier and Goderis 2009), but consistent with findings from most within-country studies 
(e.g. Caselli and Michaels (2013) for Brazil, Fan, Fang, & Park (2012) for China, Aragón and 
Rud (2013) for Northern Peru, and  Libman (2013) for Russia).  For Indonesia in particular, 
where little work has been done, our findings contrast with those of Komarulzaman and 
Alisjahbana (2006) who found mining rents were negatively associated with growth.  
However, this latter study was among the first regression based papers addressing the 
resource curse in Indonesia, and was based on cross section data for a single year, without 
control for the endogeneity of its rents measure.  Our results are consistent with those of Cust 
and Rusli (2016), who when following districts over time and using instruments, find oil and 
gas revenue dependence to be positively associated with growth in district GRDP.  We 
confirm this result, but using more recent and reliable data (post decentralisation), additional 
instruments, and the alternative resource dependence measure of mining’s share of GRDP. 
 To the extent that even some within country studies do find evidence of a resource 
curse (e.g. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), James and Aadland (2011) and Douglas and Walker 
(2016) in the United States, or Guo, Zheng, and Song (2016) in China), we might ask why 
such a curse is absent in Indonesia.  For as a resource rich developing country with recent 
experience of authoritarian governance and corruption, Indonesia might have seemed a prime 
candidate for a resource curse.   
First, the oil boom during the 1970’s and 1980’s, and the coal boom during the 2000’s, 
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instruments plus changes of physical production; Instrument 2 is binary abundance level instruments 
plus changes of physical production;  
 
revenue sharing formulas, these booms accelerated growth in outlying regions such as Eastern 
and Southern Kalimantan and Sumatra.  Regional studies of Indonesia have consistently 
identified these regions as being the most prosperous by GRDP per capita between 1999 and 
2011 (Hill, Resosudarmo, Vidyattama, 2008; Hill and Vidyattama, 2016). Other, sometimes 
descriptive studies have also noted that Indonesia has avoided a resource curse (Usui (1997), 
Rosser (2007), di John (2011) and Chandra (2012). These studies argue that Indonesia 
successfully escaped a Dutch disease during earlier oil price booms in 1973-1985 as a result 
of using its oil windfalls to strengthen both its agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 
Although such “activist” industrial policy interventions have not persisted, they may have 
benefited resource intensive regions in the years prior to decentralisation. 
Second, along with the implementation of decentralisation of public good provision 
and funding, the central government of Indonesia has encouraged the accountability of  
district governments to improve their performance through incentive systems of rewards and 
punishments.17 Financial audit investigations, for example, have been conducted annually by 
the Indonesia Audit Board (BPK) since 2005. The BPK investigates the performance of the 
central government, including State Owned Enterprises (BUMN), but it also investigates 
                                                 
17 See Davoodi and Zou (1998) for a detailed discussion of how fiscal decentralisation may raise economic 
efficiency if district governments are better placed to provide local public services, and if competition 
between district governments and rapid mobility of citizens results in better matching of preferences 





local district local governments regarding the quality of their financial reporting. The BPK 
announces their findings every six months.  Even more ambitiously, since 2010, the 
Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs has annually evaluated district governments and ranked 
them based upon their performance across several critera.18  This too is publicly circulated. 
  Thus, to the extent improved governance can forestall a resource curse, Indonesia’s 
specific implementation of decentralisation may have contributed.  The resource revenue 
redistribution formula put in place in 2004 may have contributed to expanding the ability of 
local districts to fund their broadened activities, and the incentives also put in place may have 
ensured these activities have contributed to economic growth. 
Our study cannot pinpoint the mechanisms through which resource dependence aids 
per capita income within Indonesia, and nor can we be sure that rising per capita income 
translates to broader development objectives in health, education, or poverty reduction.  
Nonetheless, when holding constant the institutional features common throughout Indonesia, 
we find evidence that on average, dependence of GRDP or government revenues on mining 
has been a blessing, rather than curse, to real per capita income.   
 
  
                                                 
18 Specifically, the Ministry of Home Affairs investigates and ranks districts according to their compliance 
with national rules and procedures, effectiveness of public consultation, transparency in budget planning 
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Appendix 1: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Real GRDP per capita 
Natural logarithm of the GRDP (Real 
Gross Regional Domestic Product) 
divided by total population at district 
level  
INDO DAPOER World Bank, The 
Indonesian National Statistical Agency 
(BPS) 
Earthquake  
The number of earthquake events at the 
district level 
Indonesian National Board for Disaster 
Management (BNPB). Can be accessed 
online here: 
http://bnpb.cloud/bnpb/tabel1  
Labour force participation 
rate 
Natural logarithm of the participation of 
labour force in the number of people at 
working age (15-65) 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
LGRDP per capita ‘05 
Natural logarithm of initial GRDP 
percapita in 2005 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
LPOP_05 




Dummy urban status (municipalities) = 1 
if urban districts, = 0 if non-urban/rural 
district 
  
Identity of urban district/municipality 
is taken from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Republic of Indonesia 
DJAVA 
Dummy of Java Island = 1 if the districts 
are located on Java Island, = 0 otherwise 
- 
Household electricity 
Per centage of households with an access 
to electricity. 
INDO DAPOER World Bank 
 
MINDEP 
The ratio of mining GRDP to total GRDP 
(real) 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
MINREV 
The share of mining revenues, summing 
oil, natural gas, and coal revenues, in total 
government budget at district level 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
OILGASREV 
The share of oil and natural gas revenues 
in total government budget, at district 
level 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 





Variable Definition Source 
COALREV 
The share of coal and other minerals 
revenues in total government budget, at 
district level 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia; BPS 
OILGAS BINARY 
Dummy variable, = 1 if at least one major 
oil or gas field operated there during 
1970’s, = 0 otherwise.  
Ooi Jin Bee (1982) 
COAL BINARY 
Dummy variable, =1 if at least 20% of 
district is covered by a “first generation” 
coal agreement contract during the 
1970’s, = 0 otherwise. 
Leeuwen (1994,2017) 
OILGAS CONTINOUS 
The number of major and minor oil and 
gas fields in 1970’s production period in 
all island in Indonesia. Major oil and 
natural gas fields is weigted by 1, and all 
minor fields are weighted by 0.25. So, if 
in district A has a 10 minor oil/gas fields 
location, therefore: 
10	 0.25 2.5 
 
 
Ooi Jin Bee (1982) 
COAL CONTINOUS 
The share of coal deposit areas (showed 
by first generation coal agreement 
contract introduced by Leeuwen (1994, 
2017)) of total area of respective district. 
 
Leeuwen (1994,2017) 
∆GRDP PER CAPITA 
The natural logarithm of difference of real 





INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
∆MINING 
DEPENDENCE 
The difference of mining dependence 
between 2015 and 2006, formulated as: 
  
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆MINING REVENUE 
The difference in mining revenue shares, 
between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆OILGAS REVENUE 
The difference in oil and gas revenue 
shares, between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆COAL REVENUE 
The difference in coal revenue shares, 
between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Finance, Republic of 
Indonesia; The Audit Board of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
∆LABOUR FORCE 
PARTIC.RATE 
The change in labour force participation 
rate between 2015 and 2006 





Variable Definition Source 
∆POPULATION (LOGS) 
The change in the population (in logs) 
between 2015 and 2006 
INDO DAPOER World Bank, BPS 
∆ COAL PRODUCTION 
The change in coal land rents and 
royalties between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, Republic of Indonesia 
∆OIL PRODUCTION 
The change in oil production (in barrels) 
between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, Republic of Indonesia 
∆GAS PRODUCTION   
The change in natural gas production (in 
MMBTU) between 2015 and 2006 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 







Appendix 2: The Distribution of Major and Minor Oil and Gas Fields (Including 
Natural Gas) in Sumatra Island in the 1970’s 
 






Appendix 3: The Location of Coal Deposit Based on First Generation Contract 
Agreements, during the 1980’s, Kalimantan and Sumatra Islands 
 
 
Source: Friederich & van Leeuwen (2017); Leeuwen (1994), mapped to 2003 Boundaries 
